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Self-control is important for everyday life and involves behavioural regulation. Self-control 27 
requires effort and completing two successive self-control tasks, typically, produces a 28 
temporary drop in performance in the second task. High self-reported motivation and being 29 
made self-aware somewhat counteracts this effect; performance in the second task is 30 
enhanced. The current study explored the relationship between self-awareness and motivation 31 
on sequential self-control task performance.  Before employing self-control in an antisaccade 32 
task, participants initially applied self-control in an incongruent Stroop task or completed a 33 
control task. After the Stroop task participants unscrambled sentences that primed self-34 
awareness (each started with the word ‘I’) or unscrambled neutral sentences. Motivation was 35 
measured after the antisaccade task. Findings revealed that after exerting self-control in the 36 
incongruent Stroop task, motivation predicted erroneous responses in the antisaccade task for 37 
those that unscrambled neutral sentences; high motivation led to fewer errors. Those primed 38 
with self-awareness, were somewhat more motivated overall but motivation did not 39 
significantly predict antisaccade performance. Supporting the resource allocation account, if 40 
one was motivated – intrinsically or via the manipulation of self-awareness - resources were 41 
allocated to both tasks leading to the successful completion of two sequential self-control 42 
tasks.  43 











A temporary deficiency in self-control: Can heightened motivation overcome this effect? 51 
Self-control is the ability required to override or inhibit an automatic/impulsive 52 
response for another, involved in successful behavioural regulation (Baumeister, Heatherton 53 
& Tice, 1994). Self-control can be applied to many situations, such as suppressing emotions, 54 
avoiding distractions at work e.g. checking social media (Otten, Cladder‐Micus, Pouwels, 55 
Hennig, Schuurmans, & Hermans, 2014). Self-control is employed regularly every day, and 56 
research has estimated that we use self-control processes approximately three to four hours 57 
each day (Hoffman, Baumeister, Foerster & Vohs, 2012). It is necessary for human social 58 
interaction and there are clear detrimental effects of self-control failure such as crime, 59 
obesity, smoking and drug problems (Hagger, Wood, Stiff & Chatzisarantis, 2010).  60 
Despite its importance and regular use, several studies have shown that engaging in 61 
self-control is effortful and when completing two sequential self-control tasks, the first task is 62 
usually performed well but a temporary deterioration in performance in the second occurs 63 
(Hagger et al., 2010). Studies typically employed a sequential self-control depletion paradigm 64 
in which two concurrent self-control tasks were completed. Frequently employed tasks 65 
include the incongruent Stroop (1935) task, a thought suppression task, attention control 66 
video task and an erasing letters task (Carter, Kofler, Forster & McCullough, 2015; Hagger et 67 
al., 2010). We recently implemented another feasible measure of inhibition - the antisaccade 68 
task (Hallett, 1978) - into a sequential self-control task paradigm (Kelly, Sünram-Lea & 69 
Crawford, 2015).  70 
The strength model/resource depletion theory of self-control (Baumeister, Vohs & 71 
Tice, 2007) suggested that the temporary deterioration in task performance following self-72 
control exertion stems from a depletion of limited energy resources. Performing a task 73 
necessitating self-control diminishes those resources and consequently fewer resources are 74 
available, resulting in weakened subsequent self-control performance.  75 




Glucose was proposed as the relevant physiological energy resource following 76 
observation that peripheral glucose levels were significantly reduced following self-control 77 
exertion (Fairclough & Houston, 2004) and that glucose relative to placebo administration 78 
restored subsequent self-control performance following prior exertion (Gailliot et al., 2007). 79 
However recent findings have failed to replicate this, challenging the relationship between 80 
glucose availability and self-control performance (Dang, 2016; Kelly, et al., 2015; Kurzban, 81 
2010; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable & Myers., 2013; Molden et al., 2012; Sanders, Shirk, 82 
Burgin & Martin, 2012). Although these findings do not necessarily imply that there is no 83 
temporary shortage in the energy and more specifically glucose supply centrally, other factors 84 
appear to play an important (but not mutually exclusive) role.  85 
  For example, level of motivation may be an important moderating factor in self-86 
control inasmuch as it might ameliorate any self-control deficiency following prior 87 
engagement. That is to say, self-control is a motivated resource and motivation determines 88 
the effort and time spent on certain tasks/behaviours (Salamore, Correa, Farrar & Mingote, 89 
2007).  Supporting this, administering a monetary incentive for task completion or being told 90 
that the tasks were important, resulted in an enhanced level of performance in a second self-91 
control task following initial exertion (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). Moreover, we 92 
previously observed that high levels of self-reported intrinsic motivation led to enhanced self-93 
control performance on a second task whereas those low in motivation showed a deterioration 94 
in antisaccade performance after initial self-control exertion (Kelly, et al., 2015).  95 
Increasing levels of self-awareness appears to have a similar restorative effect on 96 
temporary deficiencies in self-control following prior engagement. Focusing attention on the 97 
self can lead to the conscious awareness of the self, a state Duval, Wicklund and Fine (1972) 98 
labeled “objective self-awareness”. Moreover, it results in a process of self- evaluation which 99 
consists of comparing the self to a standard of correctness that specifies a state the self ought 100 




to have (Duval, et al., 1972). Specifically, anything that primes an individual about the self, 101 
such as mirrors, hearing one’s own voice, cameras can increase self-awareness levels 102 
(Stapleton & Smith, 2013; Wicklund, 1979).  103 
Indeed, it has been shown that self-focused attention has important implications for 104 
motivation and self-regulation (for reviews see Carver, 2003; Duval & Silvia, 2001; Gibbons, 105 
1990; Silvia & Duval, 2001). For example, previous research demonstrated a positive 106 
relationship between self-focused attention and self-control. Employing a sequential two-task 107 
depletion paradigm, Alberts, Martijn and De Vries (2011) used a scrambled sentence task 108 
(SST) to induce self-awareness by priming participants with sentences connected to the self, 109 
which began with the letter ‘I’. This was administered after the first self-control task - an 110 
auditory suppression task - and before a second  self-control task, which measured 111 
perseverance level in a handgrip squeezing task. Those presented with neutral primes showed 112 
a temporary deterioration in self-control performance in the handgrip task and persevered for 113 
less time but inducing self-awareness counteracted this.   114 
The finding that motivation and self-awareness moderate self-control performance 115 
support Beedie and Lane’s (2012) resource allocation account. This posits that a temporary 116 
deficiency in self-control is reflective of a reluctance to allocate resources to a task because it 117 
is not a personal priority i.e. considered important and/or interesting. Consequently the 118 
response trajectory of a temporary deficiency in self-control performance following prior 119 
exertion reflects a person’s low level of motivation; one unwilling to invest resources 120 
(Baumeister, 2014).  Applying this to the self-awareness findings, making an individual more 121 
self-aware arguably might prompt them to their performance and motivate them to allocate 122 
resources to a second task despite initial exertion. 123 
Alternative models also explain self-control performance deterioration from a 124 
motivational perspective (Inzlicht & Marcora, 2016). Baumeister’s amendment to the original 125 




resource model suggested that resources are still somewhat diminished during self-control 126 
exertion but if motivated, any remaining resources are allocated to the subsequent task 127 
(Baumeister, 2014; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, in press). The shifting priorities account (Inzlicht, 128 
Schmeichel & Macrae, 2014; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), suggests a motivational 129 
attentional shift produces the temporary reduction in self-control; one changes from 130 
completing a compulsory task to wanting to perform enjoyable tasks (Inzlicht, Legault & 131 
Temper, 2014; Baumeister, 2014).  The ‘opportunity cost’ model suggests that the motivation 132 
for task completion stems from the opportunity cost associated with the task i.e. perception of 133 
effort. Motivation is high when a task is perceived as less effortful (Kurzban, et al, 2013).  134 
The current study aimed to further explore the motivational perspectives on self-135 
control performance and assessed the relationship between self-awareness and motivation. 136 
We manipulated self-awareness by administering the SST task (Alberts et al, 2011) between 137 
two self-control tasks. Following our previous methodology (Kelly et al., 2015) an initial 138 
Stroop (incongruent vs. congruent) task was paired with an antisaccade task in a sequential 139 
two task paradigm. The prosaccade task was also administered to assess whether completion 140 
of an initial self-control task adversely affected subsequent self-control performance only or 141 
whether the observed effects were extended more generically to other saccade tasks. 142 
Secondly we measured self-reported levels of motivation using the intrinsic motivation 143 
inventory (IMI; McAuley, Duncan & Tammen, 1989). Based on Alberts et al’s (2011) 144 
findings we hypothesised that heightening self-awareness levels would counteract the 145 
temporary deficiency in self-control performance in the antisaccade task following 146 
incongruent Stroop task completion. Further, drawing on our recent findings (Kelly et al., 147 
2015) we predicted that high motivation would counteract such temporary decline and lead to 148 
sustained antisaccade performance. The relationship between the effects of self-awareness 149 
and motivation on self-control performance were examined to observe whether priming high 150 




self-awareness would be an intervention that would increase motivation and subsequently 151 




 We initially tested 61 participants but removed one participant due to the high rate of 156 
erroneous responses made in the antisaccade task (89.29%), which indicated that the 157 
instructions were not fully understood. On average healthy adult participants typically make 158 
20% of antisaccade errors (Hutton, 2008). This resulted in a final sample of 60 healthy young 159 
adults (12 male & 48 female) studying at Lancaster University (M age = 22.08 years). Before 160 
the commencement of the study, a power analysis based on Alberts et al.’s (2010) findings 161 
revealed that this sample size was sufficiently highly powered (0.74) according to Cohen’s 162 
(1988) standards. This study was ethically approved by Lancaster University’s Ethics 163 
Committee and written informed consent from all participants was provided according to the 164 
Declaration of Helsinki.  165 
 166 
Procedure  167 
Participants attended one testing session, which lasted on average 30 minutes. 168 
Participants were divided into 4 groups: Incongruent Stroop/low self-awareness, incongruent 169 
Stroop/high self-awareness, congruent Stroop/low self-awareness and congruent Stroop/high 170 
self-awareness. Participants first provided written informed consent and then completed 171 
either a congruent (control) or incongruent Stroop (which required self-control) task. The 172 
SST was then administered with participants instructed to unscramble 20 sentences to form 173 
grammatically coherent statements using 5 out of the 6 words available. Participants either 174 
received the version that primed self-awareness or a control (neutral/low self-awareness) 175 




version. Following this, the eye tracking equipment was set up and participants’ completed 176 
the prosaccade and then antisaccade tasks. This was considered optimal due to evidence of 177 
carry-over effects between the saccade tasks (Roberts, Hager & Hare, 1994).  After both 178 
saccade tasks, participants then completed the IMI, rating how meaningful/important they 179 
found the eye movement tasks to complete. At the end of testing participants were fully 180 
debriefed.  181 
 182 
Materials 183 
Scrambled sentence task (SST): Participants were presented with a list of 20 184 
scrambled sentences and instructed to unscramble each one to form a grammatically correct 185 
sentence. The self-awareness version of the task contained sentences which when 186 
unscrambled began with ‘I’ such as ‘I read books for leisure’, whereas the neutral (low self-187 
awareness) task contained sentences, which when unscrambled started with different names 188 
such as ‘Catherine reads books for leisure’.   189 
 190 
Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI) [McAuley, Duncan & Tammen, 1989]: 191 
Level of motivation was examined using the 36 items IMI. Participants made their responses 192 
on a 7-point-Likert scale, which varied from ‘not at all true’ to ‘very true’. Example 193 
statements that required a response included, ‘I thought this activity was quite enjoyable’, 194 
‘This activity was fun to do’, ‘I felt like I had to do this’ and ‘I think that this activity is 195 
useful to me’. An indication of participants’ overall level of motivation was provided by 196 
collating and averaging all 36 responses (Li, 2004).  197 
 198 
Stroop task: This computerised task involved responding to the colour (yellow, blue, 199 
green, purple or red) of a series of 135 words by pressing relevant keys on a QWERTY 200 




keyboard (based on the methodology used by Wallace and Baumeister, 2002). Participants 201 
engaged in either a congruent version (control) of the task in which the ink colour and the 202 
colour words were identical or an incongruent version (depletion), in which they differed i.e. 203 
the word purple was written in green ink. The incongruent task also required one to suppress 204 
this instruction when responding to the colour Red and alternatively respond to the written 205 
word. After the Stroop task, which was completed in 4 minutes 30 seconds, participants 206 
answered four questions, which examined different performance outcomes - pleasantness, 207 
level of effort exerted, frustration and tiredness (see Denson, von Hippel, Kemp & Teo, 2010) 208 
– in order to address whether there were differences depending on the two Stroop tasks that 209 
were completed.  210 
 211 
Saccade tasks: Participants completed both a 30 trial prosaccade task (an eye 212 
movement is made towards a presented target) and a 30 trial antisaccade (Hallett, 1978) task 213 
(an automatic prosaccade towards the target is suppressed and an eye movement is directed to 214 
the opposite side, away from the target). Participants rested their head on a cushioned chin 215 
rest, which was located 57 cm away from a 19″ computer, and the saccade tasks were 216 
presented on the screen. An Eyelink 1000 (SR Research: 1,000 Hz, <.5° accuracy) recorded 217 
saccadic responses. During both tasks, a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen 218 
and after an interval of 1,000 ms, the target – a small green dot (.6° diameter) - appeared 8° 219 
on either the left or to right of the fixation cross. The target and fixation cross both stayed on 220 
the screen for 1,000 ms (overlap), and a 1,500-ms interval preceded the next trial. Target 221 
location was randomised and appeared to the left or right of the screen with equal frequency. 222 
Calibration and validation procedures before each task were completed, which ensured all 223 
recordings were of a good and consistent standard.  224 
 225 





All statistical analysis was performed in R (R Core Team, 2015) using the linear 227 
mixed effects model package; lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). For this 228 
analysis, as participants completed a series of trials, we included a random effect for 229 
participant, to account for individual variation (Winter, 2013). A 2 (self-control condition; 230 
self-control/depletion vs. control) x 2 (self-awareness manipulation; high vs. low/neutral) x 2 231 
(saccade task; prosaccade & antisaccade) mixed factorial design with repeated measures on 232 
the third factor (saccade task) was conducted. We measured saccade performance in the eye 233 
movement tasks based on two specific parameters; saccade latency (response speed) for 234 
correct responses and the rate of erroneous responses (for the antisaccade task only).  Saccade 235 
response speed was calculated using the period between the target onset and the start of the 236 
first saccade, with amplitudes of 2° degrees or more. Responses of less than 80 ms and over 237 
500 ms were classified as anticipatory or late saccades, respectively, and removed from the 238 
analysis. For the number of errors committed in the antisaccade task, the total number of 239 
errors (incorrect saccades made towards rather than away from the target) were obtained 240 
relative to the number of correct saccadic responses directed away from the target.  241 
Response speed (latency): We performed a linear mixed effects analysis to examine 242 
whether self-control condition, self-awareness manipulation and/or motivation influenced 243 
saccadic response speed.  Initially we fitted a null model, which included participant as a 244 
random effect. We only had one item (green dot) and thus did not include item as a random 245 
effect.  We then ran through a series of models, adding task type (prosaccade & antisaccade), 246 
self-control condition (depletion vs. control) and self-awareness (high vs. neutral/control) as 247 
fixed effects, along with motivation as a covariate. We compared models with fixed effects 248 
and also those with interactions between the fixed effects using the likelihood ratio test.  249 




Correct vs. erroneous AS responses: For correct compared to erroneous antisaccade 250 
responses, we performed a Generalised Linear mixed effects analysis. Specifically, we ran 251 
through a series of separate models treating participants as random effects and both self-252 
control condition (depletion vs. control) and self-awareness condition (high vs. low/neutral) 253 
as fixed effects. Self-reported motivation was then added as a covariate to the models to 254 
assess whether differences in motivation significantly predicted the rate of errors compared to 255 
correct antisaccade responses.  256 
 257 
Results 258 
Self-reported performance differences based on the initial task completed 259 
(manipulation check)  260 
We conducted general linear modelling analysis to assess whether self-reported 261 
ratings of task pleasantness, tiredness, frustration and effort expended differed significantly 262 
depending on the initial Stroop task (congruent/control vs. incongruent/depletion) completed. 263 
This revealed no significant differences in task pleasantness [F (1, 58) = 0.20, p = .66] or 264 
ratings of tiredness [F (1, 58) = 1.98 x10 
-29
, p = 1.00] between the two versions. However 265 
there was a significant effect of frustration [F (1, 58) = 10.72, p < .001]; the incongruent (vs. 266 
congruent) Stroop task was reported to be more frustrating to complete [β = - 1.40, SE = 0.43, 267 
t = - 3.28, p <.001] than the congruent Stroop task. There was also a significant effect of 268 
effort [F (1, 58) = 30.44, p < .001]; the congruent was rated as requiring less effort than the 269 
incongruent Stroop task [β = -2.20, SE = 0.40, t = -5.52, p < .001] 270 
Accuracy: The incongruent version of the Stroop task, which required self-control 271 
was performed with less accuracy (M = 89.57, SD = 11.88) than the congruent (control) 272 
version (M = 99.71, SD = .55); specifically those completing the congruent version 273 
performed with on average 13.14% greater accuracy [β = 13.14, SE = 2.17, t = 6.05, p < 274 






Saccade performance 277 
Response speed (latency). Comparing the null model to a model, which also included 278 
task as a fixed effect revealed task to be a significant predictor of saccade response speed (χ 279 
(1)
2
 = 999.78, p , .001); the prosaccade task was performed 60.48 msecs ± 1.77 (standard 280 
errors) faster than the antisaccade task. Adding self-control condition as a fixed effect to the 281 
model did not improve the model fit, nor did including self-awareness condition and 282 
motivation and their interactions (p > .05). Results showed that participants were faster to 283 
perform the prosaccade compared to antisaccade task. The effects of self-control condition 284 
and self-awareness were not significant. Further, self-reported levels of motivation did not 285 
significantly predict response speed in either task.  286 
 287 
 Correct vs. erroneous AS responses. Firstly fitting a model with self-control 288 
condition (depletion vs. control) as a fixed effect and participants as random effects showed 289 
self-control condition to not be a significant predictor of correct AS responses; those that 290 
engaged in the initial depletion (incongruent Stroop) task (M = 17.91, SD = 15.25) committed 291 
a similar rate of errors to those that completed the control (congruent Stroop) task (M = 292 
18.03, SD = 14.19)  [β = - 0.07, SE = 0.28, Z = - 0.24, p = 0.81]. We then added self-293 
awareness to the model, which revealed this not to be a significant predictor of responses; 294 
those primed with self-awareness (M = 19.24, SD = 15.78) produced a comparative rate of 295 
errors to those primed with neutral words (M  = 16.92, SD = 13.73) [β = 0.17, SE = 0.39, Z = 296 
- 0.43, p = 0.67]. There was also no significant self-awareness x initial condition interaction 297 
[p = 0.74]. Adding self-reported levels of motivation produced no significant effect of 298 




motivation [β = 0.03, SE = 0.50, Z = 0.07, p = .95] nor was there a significant initial condition 299 
x motivation interaction [p = 0.14].  300 
 301 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 302 
 303 
However a significant 3 way self-control x self-awareness x motivation interaction on 304 
rate of erroneous responses (see Figure 1) was observed [β = 1.86, SE = 0.88, Z = 2.11, p = 305 
0.03]. Examining this interaction further and splitting by self-control condition, for 306 
participants that completed the incongruent Stroop task (self-control task), a negative 307 
relationship between erroneous responses and motivation was observed [β = - 0.96, SE = 0. 308 
48, Z = - 1.99, p = 0.04], indicating that when motivation was high, fewer erroneous 309 
responses were made in the antisaccade task. Although self-awareness alone did not predict 310 
erroneous responses in the antisaccade task [p > .05] there was a significant motivation x self-311 
awareness interaction [β = 1.58, SE = 0.68, Z = 2.34, p = 0.02]. Those that had previously 312 
applied self-control (in the incongruent Stroop task) and received the self-awareness primes 313 
performed a similar rate of antisaccade errors regardless of their level of motivation to 314 
complete the antisaccade task [β = 0.66, SE = 0.58, Z = 1.13, p = 0.26].  For participants that 315 
completed the incongruent Stroop task and were not self-primed, level of motivation 316 
predicted erroneous relative to correct antisaccade responses; those high in motivation 317 
produced less erroneous responses than those low in motivation [β = - 0.98, SE = 0.37, Z = - 318 
2.77, p = 0.01] (see Figure 1). These findings were not extended to the control group i.e. 319 









The current study explored whether the temporary deficiency in performance that is 325 
typically observed in the second of two sequential self-control tasks can be overcome by high 326 
motivation and increased self-awareness. According to the resource depletion theory 327 
(Baumeister et al. 2007) the reduction in performance consistently noted in a second of two 328 
sequential self-control tasks stems from self-control being an effortful process that relies on 329 
the availability of a limited energy resource, which reduces through exertion. Based on a 330 
previous methodological design (e.g. Kelly et al., 2015) we administered either a congruent 331 
(control) or incongruent Stroop task to participants followed by the prosaccade and 332 
antisaccade eye movement tasks. However, before the saccade tasks we manipulated self-333 
awareness by administering a SST. Self-reported levels of motivation were also measured 334 
using the IMI after the saccade tasks were completed.   335 
The findings revealed that performing an initial self-control task per se did not predict 336 
subsequent self-control performance. The current data suggests a complex relationship 337 
between self-control exertion, priming of self-awareness and level of motivation for correct, 338 
compared to erroneous, antisaccade responses. Level of motivation only predicted 339 
antisaccade performance when participants were not primed on self-awareness; those low in 340 
motivation committed more erroneous responses than those high in motivation. Thus only 341 
participants with low motivation to perform the second self-control task showed the typical 342 
self-control depletion effect consistent with the self-control literature (Hagger et al., 2010), 343 
i.e. a temporary deficiency in self-control ability in the second task following prior exertion. 344 
When participants were primed on self-awareness, motivation did not predict subsequent self-345 
control performance.  This opens up the possibility that priming self-awareness led to an 346 
increase in motivation, which in turn counteracted any temporary deficiency in self-control. 347 
These findings are in line with previous research that demonstrated i) differences in 348 




subsequent self-control performance following the initial exertion of self-control based on 349 
motivation, and ii) no difference in self-control performance for individuals who were 350 
exposed to an explicit manipulation of motivation (Alberts et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2015; 351 
Muraven and Slessarva, 2003).  According to Wicklund (1979), raising self-awareness 352 
increases motivation, as the individual is made aware of their performance level, which 353 
subsequently increases the motivation to perform a task well (Wicklund, 1979).  354 
The findings suggest that an individual who is motivated to complete a task – either 355 
through manipulation of self-awareness or intrinsic high levels of motivation – will 356 
successfully engage in a subsequent task of self-control despite earlier self-control exertion. 357 
This supports growing evidence that one’s level of motivation rather than limited resource 358 
capacity influences changes in self-control performance over time (Molden, 2013).  359 
Although the findings are consistent with a motivational account of self-control, the 360 
question arises to what extent motivational factors can compensate for limited resources 361 
(Alberts et al., 2011). According to the resource allocation theory (Beedie & Lane, 2012) 362 
resources (i.e. glucose) will be assigned based on one’s intrinsic level of motivation to 363 
complete that task. However, it is as yet unclear which underlying mechanisms determine this 364 
allocation of additional energy resources. Specifically, understanding the neurochemical 365 
mechanisms behind these findings is needed (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013).  366 
High levels of motivation could trigger an arousal/activation response resulting in 367 
energy in the form of glucose to be directed to specific brain areas for successful task 368 
completion. Specifically, being motivated to perform a task may have led to activation of the 369 
sympathetic adrenal medulla (SAM) axis, which results in the release of adrenaline 370 
(epinephrine) from the adrenal medulla and leads to increase in blood glucose levels. This is 371 
in line with recent research, which showed that increasing motivation led to an increase 372 
and/or maintenance of blood glucose levels associated with maintenance of performance 373 




levels during the second self-control task. This suggests that being motivated allows 374 
allocation of energetic resources to a task which in turn prevents performance decrements 375 
(Kazén, Kuhl & Leicht, 2015).  376 
Another potential underlying mechanism that might mediate maintenance of 377 
performance levels are dynamic changes in dopamine activity. Dopamine activity has been 378 
associated with a number of psychological processes including motivation. Potts, Martin, 379 
Burton and Montague (2006) have suggested that allocation of resources to limited-capacity 380 
systems might be regulated by dopaminergic reward system input. In the current context, 381 
increased dopaminergic activity could be linked with high motivation and the subsequent 382 
allocation of energetic and/or cognitive resources to a task. This is supported by recent 383 
conceptualisations of dopamine, which suggests the involvement of dopamine beyond solely 384 
reward processing (Salamone & Correa, 2012). In particular, the role of dopamine, in the 385 
nucleus accumbens (NA) is considered to be more wide ranging and linked to the 386 
engagement of effort and decision making (Salamone, et al., 2007).  387 
More specifically, it has been argued that dopamine controls the amount of energy 388 
one expends in achieving a goal, particularly when it is considered valuable and important 389 
(Salamone et al., 2007). When dopamine levels are higher, one is more engaged in an activity 390 
and injects more resources into its completion (Beeler, Frazier & Zhuang, 2012). For 391 
example, Treadway et al (2012) observed lower levels of dopamine led one to favouring less 392 
effortful tasks whereas enhanced dopamine levels made one willing to expend effort for a 393 
reward. In addition, an inverted U shape relationship has been observed between dopamine 394 
level and sequential self-control performance (Dang, Xiao, Liu, Jiang & Mao, 2016). 395 
Participants with ‘medium’ dopamine levels – as measured by eye blink rate (EBR), which is 396 
considered a valid measure of dopamine levels (Karson, 1983). – performed well i.e. less 397 




erroneously in a second task of self-control (the antisaccade task) despite initial exertion in a 398 
Stroop task compared to those with higher or lower levels.  399 
However, more research is needed to elucidate the role of dopaminergic systems in 400 
the complex relationship between self-control, motivation and resource allocation,  401 
Consequently based on the existing evidence, the findings support Beedie and Lane’s 402 
(2012) resource allocation account that being motivated resulted in resources being allocated 403 
to task. Although Baumeister’s (2014) amended resource theory accounts for the moderating 404 
effect of motivation, it still posits that resources are depleted following self-control exertion, 405 
and as more recent research findings have failed to observe this (Kelly et al., 2015; Molden et 406 
al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012) an account of targeted resource allocation (Beedie & Lane, 407 
2012) seems more appropriate.   It is difficult to  refute a resource perspective fully, 408 
specifically given the evidence on the resource accounts and also given that glucose is an 409 
essential energy resource for the brain and vital for cognition. Thus it seems plausible that 410 
glucose is required for self-control albeit other factors are likely to moderate this relationship.  411 
Interestingly in the current study, performance differences were only observed for 412 
correct compared to erroneous responses and not for response speed in the antisaccade task. 413 
As expected prosaccade responses were significantly faster than antisaccade responses, 414 
however neither self-awareness nor motivation directly influenced response speed. This 415 
replicates our previous study (Kelly et al., 2015), which only observed performance 416 
differences based on motivation level for errors performed. This implies a more direct 417 
motivational effect for erroneous compared to correct antisaccade response, which were not 418 
influenced by the effects on response speed. As a result the evidence more strongly supports 419 
the observation that being highly motivated counteracts the effects of self-control deficiency 420 
following prior exertion. 421 




Although we replicated Alberts et al’s (2011) design with the implementation of a 422 
SST to induce self-awareness, it would be interesting if further research expanded these 423 
methods by directly manipulating self-awareness possibly with a mirror, for example, to 424 
further assess the link between self-awareness and self-control. Moreover, it would also be 425 
beneficial to build on the findings on the relationship between self-reported motivation and 426 
self-control by further manipulating levels of motivation to assess in more detail whether 427 
motivation has an ameliorating effect on self-control deficiency in a similar way.  428 
Conclusions 429 
This study investigated the effect of self-awareness and motivation on self-control 430 
performance over time and observed whether a temporary deficiency in performance in the 431 
second task following prior exertion could be restored. The findings revealed that following 432 
the exertion of self-control, self-reported levels of motivation significantly predicted the rate 433 
of erroneous responses for those not exposed to the self-awareness primes. When self-434 
awareness was induced, there were no differences in antisaccade responses based on 435 
motivation level. This arguably supports a motivation resource account; following the 436 
application of self-control, if one is motivated to perform a second self-control task – 437 
stemming from self-awareness resulting in one wanting to perform well or if this is not 438 
induced, based on how interesting and/or enjoyable the task or tasks were perceived to be – 439 
this has a restorative effect on a temporary deficiency in self-control ability, leading one to 440 
allocate resources and perform the second task well. This supports the idea of self-control 441 
performance based on more targeted allocation of resources rather than depletion and shows 442 
that interventions targeted at motivation can help overcome the effect of impaired self-control 443 
performance following prior exertion.  444 
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Figure caption 618 
Figure 1: The relationship between motivation, self-awareness manipulation and self-control 619 
condition for the proportion of erroneous antisaccade responses.  620 
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